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ABSTRACT 
The historical inequalities and imbalances, so deeply embedded in the institutional structures and 
discourse of higher education, persist to haunt university spaces as these institutions continue to 
veer towards notions of transformation. While statues have been removed, buildings renamed and 
fees adjusted, higher education in South Africa remains a largely disparate and alienating 
topography – especially because of the gaping wounds left by iterative student protestations. 
Seemingly, the more leadership structures in higher education stonewalled student protestations, 
the more student resistance intensified – not only in scope, but also in violence. In this sense, we 
take note of Foucault’s (1997) dyadic depiction of power and resistance, that is, power necessarily 
provokes resistance, since without resistance, there can be no power. In this article, we firstly 
reflect on the necessity of resistance not only in relation to power, but also as a practice that ought 
to be ubiquitous to higher education. Secondly, it is our contention that if higher education is to 
fulfil its ideological mandate of doing things differently for the sake of epistemological and public 
good, then it necessarily has to be underscored by dissonance. 
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A GLANCE AT HIGHER EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The deep historical inequalities, inequities and disparities embedded in higher education in 
South Africa were always going to need a bold overhaul. This overhaul needed to (and still 
needs to) walk a tightrope between redressing former injustices in terms of access, resources 
and opportunities, and ensuring a sustainable relationship between knowledge 
production/development and a post-apartheid economy. The redress agenda is witnessed in the 
White Paper 3: A Programme for the Transformation of Higher Education (Department of 
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Education (DoE) 1997), which aims to modify the higher education system into an integrated, 
‘single, national co-ordinated system that would ensure diversity in its organisational form and 
the institutional landscape, mix of institutional missions and programmes commensurate with 
national and regional needs in social, cultural and economic development’ (DoE 1997, 2.3). 
The White Paper 3 (DoE 1997) was succeeded by the Higher Education Amendment Act (DoE 
1998), and then the National Plan for Higher Education (DoE 2001). These education policy 
initiatives have been driven by a dual-purpose of firstly, separating post-apartheid higher 
education from its historically unequal and divisive past. And secondly, to address utilitarian 
demands, which have meant subscribing to a largely neo-liberalist agenda of the corporatisation 
and marketization of higher education. As a result, the National Plan for Higher Education (DoE 
2001) identifies sixteen objectives. These include increasing student access, particularly from 
historically marginalised, black communities into the university sector, and enhancing students’ 
cognitive abilities with respect to technical and professional competences that would not only 
ensure greater competitiveness in an ever-evolving labour market economy, but also increased 
participation as democratic citizens in service of the public good (DoE 2001).  
Emanating from these reform measures are two sets of challenges. The first challenge 
relates to a recognition, which calls for the transformation and decolonisation of higher 
education spaces and which cannot be dislodged from South Africa’s apartheid history, as 
confirmed by the waves of student protestations. The second challenge emanates from a 
realisation that the types of reform and policies, which have thus far occurred within higher 
education, have, as yet, not addressed past inequities and exclusions. Institutions of higher 
education in post-apartheid South Africa continue to be defined by wide discrepancies in terms 
of financial and material resources. Moreover, students, who were previously excluded due to 
race and ethnicity, continue to be marginalised and disadvantaged in terms of financial ability. 
These challenges are acknowledged by Higher Education South Africa (HESA 2014, 11) as 
follows:  
 
The continued under-developed institutional capacities of historically black institutions must be 
emphasized; providing access to rural poor and working class black students, inadequate state 
support for the historically black institutions to equalize the quality of undergraduate provision 
compromises their ability to facilitate equity of opportunity and outcomes.  
 
Badat (2010, 7) maintains that there continues be a problematic tension between the values and 
goals of higher education, and what has actually taken shape. Managing and implementing an 
agenda, which simultaneously redresses social equity and quality higher education, has created 
difficult and tense socio-political challenges (Badat 2010, 7). On the one hand, focusing 
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exclusively on social equity, according to Badat (2010, 7), ‘compromises the production of high 
quality graduates with the requisite knowledge competencies and skills, and adversely affects 
economic development’. On the other hand, a focus on quality or standards, ‘results in equality 
being retarded or delayed with limited erosion of the racial and gender character of the high-
level occupational structure’ (Badat 2010, 7). Higher education, therefore, is left with an 
unenviable situation of having to increase access to historically excluded students, without 
adequate funding, while also being held to particular standards of graduate attributes. 
Consequently, debates and discussions about the transformation in higher education is a highly 
contested and contestable arena. Because the transformation agenda, as Badat (2010, 7) argues, 
is embodied in paradoxes, it is to be expected that responses from students would be equally 
problematic and frustrated – as evident in the series of #mustfall campaigns, which came to 
characterise the student protests. To Jansen (2004, 293), the turmoil and uncertainty in higher 
education in South Africa has come to resemble exactly the ‘distortion, upheaval and 
fragmentation that marked the sector at the start of the 1990s’. At the heart of the distortion and 
fragmentation is a reality that the level of state funding in terms of financial aid for students 
who are academically eligible for admission to universities and who meet the criteria of the 
largely state-funded National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) is inadequate to support 
all deserving students at appropriate levels for undergraduate and postgraduate study (Badat 
2016, 3). Badat (2016, 4) explains that state is aware of the measures that are required to ensure 
that higher education addresses effectively equity, quality, and development problems. 
Moreover, continues Badat (2016, 4), the budget for higher education has increased, and funds 
have, indeed, been provided to address important issues and areas. What remains the problem, 
according to Badat (2016, 4) is that ‘state funding has been inadequate to support universities 
to discharge their critical purposes of producing knowledge, cultivating high quality graduates, 
and engaging meaningfully with diverse communities, to play the diverse roles they must to 
help realize environmentally sustainable economic development, equity, social justice, and a 
vibrant democracy, and do all this in a way that ensures that the necessary transformations 
related to equity, the nature and quality of learning and teaching, research, and institutional 
culture also occur simultaneously within higher education’. 
Du Toit (2000, 93) explains that the ongoing challenges and tensions created through 
inadequate funding, student accommodation, as well as subsistence, are exacerbated by the 
prospect of large debt, high drop-out rates, poor throughput rates, inadequate facilities, and 
largely unreconstructed epistemologies and ontologies. To Du Toit (2000, 93), one cannot 
ignore the fact that a number of higher education institutions continue to be immersed in a 
‘whiteness’, which are products of the historical ‘legacies of intellectual colonisation and 
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racialization’. This ‘whiteness’ has not only perpetuated particular patterns of teaching and 
learning, but has left alienating and disempowering academic and institutional cultures 
unchanged. (Du Toit 2000, 93). For this reason, the majority of historically disadvantaged 
students, who have accessed historically advantaged institutions, feel displaced and disengaged 
not only from institutional cultures, but from their own teaching and learning experiences.  
Following on the above, it becomes necessary to understand why, in spite of the immense 
reform and transformation in higher education, past inequalities and inequities not only persist, 
but are also being compounded. One way of making sense of this tension, and increasing 
frustration of students, is a recognition that, as elsewhere, institutions of higher education in 
South Africa are influenced, and continue to respond to the neoliberalist agenda of 
corporatisation. To Aronowitz and Giroux (2000, 333), what the corporatisation of higher 
education has achieved, is to annul democratic impulses by either devaluing them or absorbing 
such impulses within the imperatives of the marketplace. In addition, corporatisation has 
reformulated social issues as largely individual or economic considerations Aronowitz and 
Giroux (2000, 333). Aronowitz and Giroux (2000) contend that as corporate culture and values 
influence and define university life, a number of replacements occur. These include the 
replacement of social planning by corporate planning; management becomes a substitute for 
leadership; and the private domain of individual achievement replaces the discourse of public 
politics and social responsibility (Aronowitz and Giroux 2000). It would appear that, while the 
mechanisms for exclusion have changed from race to economics, the end result is the same: 
denial of access and opportunity. And because the experiences of historically disadvantaged 
(black) students continue to be relegated to the margins (whether in an apartheid or post-
apartheid society) by those in power, their responses continue to be that of resistance.  
 
THE DYADIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER AND RESISTANCE 
The exertion of power, says Foucault (1982, 788), is not simply a relationship between subjects 
or partners – as individuals or as a collective. Rather, the exercise of power, ‘is a way in which 
certain actions modify others’ (Foucault 1982, 788). In this sense, continues Foucault (1982), 
the argument that power somehow exists in a diffused form, is not true. Foucault (1982, 788) 
maintains that power ‘exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is integrated 
into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures’. While power 
might indeed emanate from relationships of consent and consensus, power, continues Foucault 
(1982, 778), is neither a function of consent nor is it in itself a renunciation of freedom. In other 
words, the practice or exertion of power does not exist in a binary relationship to freedom. To 
Foucault (1982, 789), a relationship of power is defined as a ‘mode of action which does not 
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act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an 
action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future’.  
While power might be opposed by passivity or resistance, Foucault (1982, 789) explains 
that a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each 
indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: ‘that “the other” (the one over whom 
power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who 
acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, 
and possible inventions may open up’. To this end, Foucault (1982, 781) is less concerned with 
‘such or such’ an institution of power, or group or elite or class, and is more interested in a 
‘technique, a form of power’. He explains as follows: 
 
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, 
marks him [her] by his [her] own individuality, attaches him [her] to his [her] own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him [her] which he [she] must recognize and which others have to 
recognize in him [her]. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two 
meanings of the word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to 
his [her] own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power 
which subjugates and makes subject to (Foucault 1982, 781). 
 
Power, continues Foucault (1998, 63), ‘is everywhere’ and ‘comes from everywhere’, making 
it a ‘regime of truth’ that infiltrates and diffuses society, which, in turn, makes power a major 
source of discipline and compliance. He also believes in the possibilities of action and 
resistance. As a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 1998, 63), higher education seemingly embodies 
not only knowledge production, but also a pathway out of poverty, and hence autonomy. The 
power constituted within higher education therefore stems from what it stands to offer, to whom 
it will make this offer, and whether this offer will indeed be sustainable. In this regard, students 
might be offered acceptance, thereby including them in the echelons of university halls, but this 
acceptance is a precarious one, as the strings of financial constraints and social immobility 
begin to tug them away from the centre of opportunity, and back towards to the periphery of 
marginalisation. When students resist to succumbing to the periphery, they are not only 
attempting to lay claim to what ought to be their rightful place to access and opportunity, but 
they are also laying claim to their rightful place and power to act autonomously and freely.  
In order for power relationships to emerge, explains Foucault (1997, 292), there ‘must be 
at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides’. On the one hand, higher education has the 
power to include or not to include students. Simultaneously, higher education has the power to 
exclude students, even after they have been included. On the other hand, students have the 
power to apply for inclusion as well as the power to resist when higher education attempts to 
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exclude them. For Foucault (1980, 97), ‘forms of resistance against different forms of power’ 
imply that power happens within the freedom of the individual who resists what he or she 
encounters. Higher education, therefore, cannot simply assume that students will succumb to 
its hegemonic practices. Such an assumption belies the autonomy and freedom of students to 
act in relation to their own subjective experiences. In this sense, students are equipped, and 
have the power to think critically about the society in which they find themselves, they have 
the intelligence to make navigate and understand the ‘regime of truth’ of higher education, for 
example, and they also have the power and/or freedom to contest or resist this ‘regime of truth’ 
(Foucault 1998, 63). They therefore have the power to resist the expected conduct and 
compliance that higher education might expect of them. In power relationships, says Foucault 
(1997, 292), ‘there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility 
of resistance (of violent resistance, flight, deception, strategies capable of reversing the 
situation), there would be no power relations at all’. Power is dyadic in the sense that power 
functions when people act in multi-directional relationships, and power operates in ongoing 
confrontations and contestations towards change as it affects the ways in which people interact 
in the context of both domination and/or exclusion (Foucault 1998). Put differently, power and 
resistance or opposition are relational. In this respect, explains Foucault (1991, 75), resistance 
to power is about ‘detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, 
and cultural, within which it operates at the present time’. 
Following on the above, Foucault (1998) considers struggle or resistance as embedded 
within power relationships to be resistance relationships. Resistance, states Foucault (1998, 95), 
is what eludes power, and power targets resistance as its adversary. As such, forms and 
articulations of resistance present a perpetual source of provocation, so that complicity and 
complacency remain at bay. Pickett (1996, 459) explains that from Foucault’s (1998) 
perspective, power is only accepted to the extent that it is hidden. This means, states Pickett 
(1996, 459), that unless power is relatively invisible, it (power) will provoke resistance by what 
it has produced. If power is to minimise resistances, maintains Pickett (1996, 459), then it must 
seek to individualise and divide the forces of the institutions it creates. For Foucault (1980, 97), 
‘forms of resistance against different forms of power’, or agonism implies that power happens 
within the freedom of the individual who resists what he or she encounters. Stated differently, 
if the self does not wish to succumb to power and wishes to care for the self, then that agonism 
against power is in itself an expression of freedom.  
In this regard, Pickett (1996, 461) asserts that having knowledge of the functioning of 
power is to be constructed with the goal of fostering and rendering the practice of resistance 
more effectively. In other words, if an individual has a better sense of the workings and 
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relationships of power, he or she is better equipped to struggle or incite against it, thereby 
perpetually shifting towards governmentality. According to Pickett (1996, 447), Foucault 
dismisses imposing limits upon resistance – implying that resistance to power can neither be 
constrained, not contained. Foucault’s (1998) resistance is ultimately wedged between two 
unacceptable positions: ‘either place restrictions upon resistance and remain trapped in modern 
power, or celebrate any form of resistance and thereby sanction the worst forms of engagement’. 
Moreover, continues Pickett (1996, 461), if resistance is worthwhile, as Foucault (1980) clearly 
believes it is, then the conditions which make struggle possible should be fostered. As such, 
agonism as struggle and mutual incitement is necessary for the conditions that will cultivate 
human flourishing, since an individual will only struggle against something or another if he or 
she cares enough to do so.  
 
DISSONANCE AS A NEED FOR DOING THINGS DIFFERENTLY 
Throughout Foucault’s writings on power relationships, he consistently reminds us of the 
importance of individuals and groups to contest and resist domination and exercise freedom in 
order to pursue their pedagogical interests. Foucault, explains Ryan (2009, 67), gives attention 
to how individuals might liberate themselves from the governance of social configurations, 
which are legitimised through ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 1998, 63). In a Foucauldian way, 
continues Ryan (2009, 67), freedom is neither a singular ideal, nor an achievable state – that is, 
freedom is not necessarily realisable. Rather, what freedom implies is a practice of constantly 
being cognisant and alert to the various ways in which ‘regimes of truth’ govern the lives of 
individuals and groups. Stated differently, the practice of freedom is given shape in the 
individual’s capacity and willingness to untie and challenge the constraints and restrictions of 
governance. This practice, argues Ryan (2009, 67), is liberating ‘in that the governance of 
behavioural norms and discursive rules are often hidden by their familiarity and our dependence 
upon them in our day to day coping. Thus, exposing them as inessential is the first step in re-
evaluating and loosening these norms and rules’.  
In his argument for dissonance, Foucault (1983) ruptures a universalist notion of reason 
in human thought processes, that is, striving towards a need to adopt a de-centred conception 
of lived experiences. In this sense, an individual does not have to be only this or that, but can 
adopt any or multiple identities, referring to Foucault’s (1983, 237) ‘many ways of being’. 
Foucault (1983, 237) contends, ‘From the idea that the self is not given to us, I think that there 
is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art’, implying to 
link the self to creativity and not to authenticity. Commensurate with Foucault’s (1983) seminal 
thoughts on dissonance, we shall accentuate at least three aspects that could have a reasonable 
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bearing on higher education discourse, more specifically, teaching and learning. For this 
section, we focus on our teaching with Postgraduate Certificate in Education students, in 
particular, how they respond to the notion of dissonance in pedagogic relationships. We 
examine how students respond in three ways: firstly, in relation to dissonance as ‘a sudden 
upheaval of thought’ whereby control and judgment are suspended (discomfort); secondly, 
about the freedom to reflect and oppose domination (criticism); and thirdly, about seeing things 
never before thought of (scepticism) (Foucault 1983). 
Firstly, dissonance as a ‘sudden upheaval of thought’ can be used in pedagogic 
relationships with students when university teachers contrive to evoke students’ responses in 
relation to pedagogic moments in which the former (that is, the teachers) relinquish control of 
a classroom. The idea of sudden upheavals speaks to both teachers and students being open to 
the unexpected and being prepared to have particular views or understandings disrupted. 
Teachers and students alike might think that they have a clear and tangible idea about this topic 
or that, or how a subject should be taught. But what the possibility of sudden upheavals offers, 
is an openness and willingness for teaching and learning to be brought into discomfort and 
uncertainty. In this regard, a teacher suspends his or her premature judgment about a societal 
occurrence and simultaneously also constrains his or her conclusive judgment about the matter. 
In other words, a pedagogy of discomfort is implemented when students are provoked to speak 
their minds yet they remain wary of offending others in a pedagogic relationship.  
For instance, on the issue of whether colonialism had been advantageous for modern 
society, some students were challenged to think beyond the mundane and to come up with 
understandings that are neither convincing nor conclusive. So, some students who averred that 
colonialism was good for society were challenged to rethink their premature judgment without 
also proffering a final judgment on the matter, as new ideas would always put a new spin on a 
matter. In this sense, they were encouraged to suspend their initial preconceived ideas and 
understandings of why they thought colonialism was advantageous for a society. And, instead 
they were invited to consider colonialism from the perspective of those to whom colonialism 
might not have been advantageous. To expect students to suspend their premature judgments 
on any matter is not a straightforward exercise, since these judgments are deeply embedded in 
their own particular lived experiences. The point of the exercise had less to do with changing 
particular worldviews than it had to do with students being willing to think about matters anew 
and being willing to have their views challenged. Of course, the claim can be made that such a 
suspension of judgment could constrain students’ speech whereby they take up a particular 
stand. However, the point of view that they eventually internalise in the light of more insightful 
thoughts could be more durable instead of haphazardly reaching finality about a matter. In any 
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case, reaching finality about a matter would oppose any thought that might be more open and 
convincing than previously held ones. In this way, a pedagogy of discomfort is aimed at 
students reaching out for meanings that are persuasive without inhibiting responses that could 
be otherwise. In this way, learning would be continuously based on an acceptance of judgments 
that are neither premature nor conclusive. In any case, such judgments that are irrefutable would 
mark the end of learning as learning in itself would be constrained.  
Secondly, students in our class are constantly encouraged to reflect freely and to oppose 
forms of domination constantly. This implies that even we as university teachers ought to be 
challenged if students found that our views are presented too dogmatically. For instance, one 
of us was justifiably challenged by a student when it was claimed that dissonance in teaching 
is not feasible for implementation with younger learners. However, if younger learners are not 
urged to reflect freely and to oppose even teacher dominance, such a situation would invariably 
inhibit student responses in pedagogic relationships. In this way, such a pedagogic relationship 
would no longer be an encounter, as in an encounter, the self-understandings of both learners 
and teachers are invoked. In any case, the earlier young children are encouraged to think about 
the world around them, the better placed they would be to speak out about this world, and 
especially the world of higher education. Inasmuch as we encounter a number of students who 
are willing to challenge us (as teachers) on our views, we are deeply aware and concerned about 
the high number of silent voices in our classroom. Too many students remain quiet in the midst 
of discussions and debates where their voices are most needed and valuable, especially in 
relation to a topic such as colonialism, for example. Of course, we recognise that these silences 
could, in fact, be attributed to colonialism, since the marginalisation implemented through 
colonialism, also ensured the muting of people’s voices. When using dissonance in pedagogic 
encounters, students ought to see things differently. This means they should be encouraged to 
reflect deeply to the extent that they come up with thoughts not held or thought of before. For 
instance, some students expressed the view that colonialism cannot be considered a legitimate 
reason for human progress. Even if progress had been made, one cannot weigh these advantages 
without considering the contributions masses of people, especially indigenous communities, 
have made to the advancement of a society. Not only did indigenous people not gain from 
colonialism, but the alienating effect of colonialism has ensured that their contributions have 
been dismissed. The latter view, immediately addresses the contention that change should only 
be associated with the capacity of the coloniser to do so at the expense of the then excluded 
capacities of indigenous communities.  
Thirdly, Foucault’s scepticism about human thought and practice is confirmed by his 
insistence to see ‘truths’ ‘from the back of your mind’ (Foucault 1994, 447). In other words, 
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Foucault (1994, 447) avers that scepticism ‘allows you to see again something you had never 
completely lost sight of’. By implication, for Foucault, pedagogical relationships should be 
understood and practiced with what is nearby, yet having a distant view of such human actions. 
To be nearby something means that one has not abandoned that thought in its entirety and that 
one remains attached to a thought one has ‘never before thought out’ (Foucault 1994, 448). To 
be distant from a thought implies some detachment from a thought, which allows one ‘to see 
again’ something differently – a ‘breaking-free’ from an old thought that no longer surprises 
one (Foucault 1994, 446). By implication, assessment practices should be considered human 
action to which one remains attached with the possibility that one could simultaneously be 
detached from such action. According to Marginson (1993, 251), scepticism in education means 
using the process of learning for the purpose of conscious self-questioning and self-
development. Marginson (1993, 251) continues by saying that Foucault ‘distinguishes between 
knowledge that constitutes information (connaissance) and knowledge where the knowing 
subject – the student or researcher – uses the process of acquiring that knowledge for a process 
of self-transformation (savoir)’. This self-transformation, according to Foucault (1991, 69), is 
linked to the construction of what is known, that is the ‘known object’. While the acquisition 
of connaissance is relatively easy to measure (Marginson 1993, 251), the acquisition of savoir 
is not. ‘Self-transformation has unpredictable lifelong effects which cannot be subjected to 
competency measurement. Necessarily, they are diffuse and indirect. But these forms of 
knowledge are often the most important effects of education’ (Marginson 1993, 251).  
In the main, a pedagogy of dissonance along the lines of discomfort, criticism and 
scepticism has the capacity to engender opportunities for pedagogic encounters to undergo 
plausible change. In this way, a significant aspect of higher education discourse, that is, teaching 
and learning through dissonance, can contribute towards actuating unwavering change and 
towards doing things differently. Our concerns about the increasing numbers of student 
protestations are not that these protestations are occurring. Indeed, as we have argued for in this 
article, protestations as forms of resistance are constitutive of any enactments of power, as we 
encounter in higher education. Here we are reminded of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s parable of 
‘something is in the pictured pot’ (Cavell 1979, 338). If one were to describe what is wrong 
with the aforementioned assertion, such as to describe the ‘emptiness’ of the assertion in the 
sense that a picture of a boiling pot of water does not actually have boiling water in it. Rather, 
it remains an image of boiling water in a pot. If there were boiling water in the pictured pot it 
should have the potential to transfer heat to a human’s hand on touching it. So, Wittgenstein 
(Cavell 1979, 338) is right when he avers that there is a momentary madness in the assertion 
that the pictured pot actually contains boiling water. Simultaneously, those looking at the 
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pictured pot cannot deny that something is in the pot, that is, boiling water. When one observes 
an image with a pot filled with boiling water yet have accepted that something is simultaneously 
in and also not in the pictured pot, then one experiences a moment of scepticism (Cavell 1979, 
338). Likewise, our concerns centre on the reality that student protestations follow the same 
patterns and invariably end in questionable displays of violence – thereby provoking the same 
responses of condemnation from those in power within higher education.  
The articulation of dissonance requires not only an upheaval of thought in terms of the 
mechanics and processes of higher education. Dissonance also requires an upheaval of thought 
in terms of how students locate themselves and express their resistance. In this sense, if the 
intention of resistance to higher education is to ensure that ongoing practices of marginalisation 
are erased, and that the public university addresses the needs of all public and not only those 
with economic capital, then students have to be as willing to do things differently. This might 
mean, embarking on actions of dissent, without necessarily invoking violence, that is, in much 
the same way one recognises boiling water in a pictured pot without accepting it as actually 
boiling water. It might also mean engaging in practices of dissonance whereby the acceptance 
of disagreement is understood as a necessary part of the pedagogical arena of higher education, 
so that upheaval of thought becomes a part of the deliberative process, rather than an outcome.  
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